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Patrick McEachern. Inside the Red Box: North Korea’s Totalitarian Politics. New York:
Columbia University Press. 2011.

Among all nations with nuclear capacities, North Korea remains the world’s poorest.
Not surprisingly, perhaps, the nation is willing to use its nuclear know-how as a bargaining
tool in negotiations with other countries, a tendency that often frustrates and confounds those
attempting to negotiate with the single-party state. Indeed, to much of the world, North Korea
largely retains its enigmatic image as a ‘black box,’ ruled by an autocratic Kim Jong-il (son of
North Korea’s longest serving and totalitarian leader—and Kim Jong Il’s father—Kim Il
Sung). In this context, the publication of Patrick McEachern’s new book, Inside the Red Box:
North Korea’s Totalitarian Politics, is timely. McEachern, a specialist in North Korean
affairs, challenges the stereotypical view of this country as “some type of monolith” and
argues that although Kim’s role is critically important within the political arena, North
Korea’s political institutions play an equally critical role in North Korean politics (p. 4).
Following his main argument about the existence of a level of pluralism among the political
institutions in North Korean, McEachern takes the reader on an exciting journey through the
evolution of North Korean political life under the regimes of the two Kims.
Through analysis and critique of the competing theories or models of North Korean
politics (including totalitarianism, post-totalitarianism, personalism, institutional pluralism
and corporatism), McEachern argues that the post-totalitarian model allows for the clearest
understanding of the North Korean state and its policy making mechanisms. According to the
author, the post-totalitarian model is one in which the politics within an otherwise totalitarian
regime are somehow shaped or influenced by the forces of competing institutions within the
state, thereby tempering the authority of the regime leader. This means that McEachern’s
focus is primarily concerned not with “whether [power] is dispersed” within North Korean
politics but “how [it] is dispersed” (emphasis added) (p.30). By connecting his posttotalitarian model with extensive empirical data that include translated speeches of North
Korean leaders, official reports, commentaries, and articles, he suggests that all traditional
models previously applied to the political analysis of North Korea have limitations and are,
therefore, unable to truly capture the complexities of the North Korean political reality.
The book is divided into eight chapters. In the core of the book is the analysis of the three
major institutions that help maintain North Korean regime continuity: the cabinet (the
government), the military (the Korean People’s Army), and the party (the Korean Worker’s
party). McEachern discusses the primary political debates among these three institutions on
three major policies: the State’s economic policy, its inter-Korean policy, and its U.S. policy.
The book begins with the description of a disagreement between Kim Jong Il, the chairman of
the National Defense Commission and the general secretary of the Korean Worker’s Party,
and Kim Yong-sun, the Korean Worker’s Party Secretary, concerning the presence of
American troops on the Korean peninsula during a historic visit of the South Korean President
to Pyongyang in June 2000 (pp.1-2). Such an opening sets the stage for McEachern to
introduce his main argument about the importance of both individuals and institutions in
North Korean bureaucracy and the need, therefore, to examine the roles of both individuals
and institutions when analyzing North Korea’s decision making processes. Next, McEachern
briefly outlines North Korea’s current economic policy and its policies toward South Korea
and the U.S. He then offers a model for understanding North Korean politics based on the
strong theoretical tradition of comparative politics (the empirical work of area studies),
followed by his own contributions and reactions to these ideas (p.11). (On this note, the nature
of McEachern’s contributions does lead the reader to wonder whether this text should be seen
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as a contribution to the academic field or rather as a timely, topical reader consisting of the
practical contributions of a foreign-service officer stationed in Seoul.)
In the second chapter, McEachern analyzes a number of theoretical models that are
often applied to North Korean political structures and hypothesizes that under Kim Jong Il’s
regime, authority remains centralized, and Kim Jong Il remains an autocratic leader. However,
he says, power is more diffuse in today’s North Korea than it was under the regime of Kim’s
father, Kim Il Sung (p.34). McEachern develops his main argument further by proposing the
presence of bureaucratic resistance in North Korean politics, a presence that supports
McEachern’s hypothesis that political institutions in North Korea do indeed possess authentic
political leverage (and a presence that would not likely exist if Kim Jong Il were not at least
minimally amenable to political exchange) (p.48). The theoretical discourse presented in this
chapter makes McEachern’s work useful not only for understanding the North Korean state
but also for understanding post-socialist or post-communist regimes generally. The second
chapter also introduces a research methodology based on content analyses of North Korea’s
elite press, translated into English by North Korean interpreters. Such analyses are used to
understand the political debate among the North Korean government, the military, and the
Korean Workers’ party. Such a choice is perfectly logical, as the three major themes selected
for analysis within this text make up the core of the North Korean political debate. However,
McEachern’s overemphasis on theory leads to a weakness in the text with respect to
understanding the human side of such regimes. When analyses are elevated to the level of
models and concepts that describe political regimes, the result is a certain dissociation from
human agency. While McEachern correctly points on page 21 that “[t]otalitarian regimes are
short lived.” the human cost of such regimes must not be forgotten.
Chapter Three focuses on the evolution of North Korean politics under Kim Il Sung
and provides historical context for the current North Korean regime. McEachern notes that
while much has been written about the birth of the state and its impending death, there is a gap
in evaluating the whole of North Korea’s political history (p.52). He attempts to bridge this
gap in this and the next chapters by constructing a history of the North Korean political
regime, thereby making this chapter an appropriate stand-alone reading for those who may be
interested in a concise history of the North Korean political regime.
Chapter Four discusses in more detail the three main political players in North Korean
politics as McEachern sees it: the cabinet, the Korean People’s Army, and the Korean
Workers’ Party. The chapter also describes North Korea’s security apparatus, the Supreme
People’s Assembly (SAP), and provincial and local governments and judiciaries and their
respective relations with the government, the army, and the party. McEachern concludes that
the state’s three major political institutions have a corporate-like identity and provide an
institutional world view in regard to political policy. However, he says, the country’s
constitutional entities (the security apparatus, the SAP, and the subnational governments and
their judiciaries) do not have systematic influence on national policy decisions (p.99).
The next three chapters test the theoretical constructions described in the first half of
the book and examine a number of specific policy issues through analyses of political debate
in the North Korean central press. Chapter Five starts with an examination of the 1998
constitutional revision and takes the reader through the launch of the first North Korean
rocket, Taepodong-1, in September 1998 and, in [name year], the negotiations with the U.S.
regarding inspections of Kumchang-ri, a suspected nuclear facility. This chapter also
examines the deterioration of North Korean-U.S. relations as a result of the OPlan 5027,
extracted by the Combined Forces, which outlined military actions that would be undertaken
by joint U.S.-South Korean forces in the case of military conflict between North Korea and
South Korea. The chapter focuses further on North Korean economic policy and concludes
with a discussion of inter-Korean relations. The culmination of the negotiations between
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North and South Korea, in June 2000, became the first summit between the two Koreas,
ending only ten days before the fiftieth anniversary of the start of the Korean War. For
McEachern, it is important that during these negotiations, Kin Jong Il openly admitted that he
had chosen to engage in such inter-Korean negotiation despite objection from within his own
party. This admission of Kim Jong Il’s further supports McEachern’s hypothesis that North
Korean politics is shaped not only by some totalitarian force within Kim Jong Il as an
individual but rather by the jockeying for and negotiation of power among the three major
political institutions in North Korea. Indeed, McEachern uses the word “jostling” to describe
the angling for power demonstrated by these three political entities during the turbulent years
from 1998 to 2001, a period that was full of struggle for bureaucratic supremacy and control
of political agendas between the party, the military and the cabinet.
The next chapter, covering the period between 2001 and 2006, is the largest in the
book and is heavy on empirical data based on the entire spectrum of political events that
unfolded following the 9/11, during which the struggle for power among the three leading
North Korean political institutions continued to dominate the agenda of political life. In this
chapter in particular, McEachern demonstrates that North Korea responded quite
appropriately to the rather inappropriate demands of the Bush administration for North
Korean regime change (pp.156-157). In his State of the Union Address in January 2002,
President Bush grouped together Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an “axis of evil.” This united
the North Korean political institutions together in opposition to the U.S. and prevented North
Korea from engaging in any authentic diplomatic discourse with the U.S. for some time.
Interestingly, McEachern’s detailed analysis of the political debate between North Korea and
the Bush administration regarding U.S. international policy (heavily affected by Bush’s
rhetoric and his so-called “axis of evil”) leads the reader to understand these debates in a new
light: McEachern suggests that by not engaging in Bush’s pseudo-diplomatic discourse, North
Korea was able to move beyond an ideological trap set by the U.S. and, in so doing,
demonstrated simple common sense. This sidestepping of U.S. rhetoric ultimately permitted
North and South Korea to engage more authentically in a conversation on inter-Korean
relations and North Korean economic development.
Chapter Seven provides an analysis of the shift in policies in both North Korea and the
U.S. The punitive approach promoted by the Bush administration during 2001-2006 did not
reach the desired results, and the U.S. subsequently moved towards a more accommodating
diplomatic course. Between the years of 2006 and 2008 North Korean policy likewise
underwent a marked shift regarding, first of all, international relations with its major partners,
the U.S. and South Korea. This occurred as a result of diplomatic efforts to improve relations
with North Korea by the Bush administration at the end of the Bush presidency, and, on
another hand, the “hard” policy towards North Korea promoted by new South Korean
President, Lee Myung-bak, the first conservative president in a decade who was elected in
2008. External factors influenced the internal debates. Between the years of 2006-2008, the
party and the military won over the cabinet’s efforts for marketization, that influenced
economic policy between 2001 and 2006, and a significant shift took place towards food
distribution at the expense of the markets. For McEachern, this ability of institutions to shape
political debates in North Korea and change the political course can most effectively be
explained by the post-totalitarian institutionalism model (p.214).
In the final chapter, McEachern confirms that Kim Jong Il’s regime is different today
from the regime of his father. The son uses the old strategy of ‘divide and conquer’ when he
pits institutions against each other. As a result, McEachern comes to the conclusion that
despite the leverage of political institutions in North Korea, no organized opposition “to the
state exists within the country” (p.218). Still, he argues that the North Korean state is not as
monolithic as a pure totalitarian model would suggest (p.219). His argument is based on a
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detailed analysis of the political debate of the three major political institutions that he
undertook in the second half of the book in chapters five, six and seven.
McEachern’s analyes provide the possibility of some prediction of North Korean’s political
responses, at least to U.S. politics. As such, the North Korean ‘black box’ has begun to
undergo a transition into a ‘red box,’ one which became less enigmatic to this reader over the
course of McEachern’s work. Using the Foucauldian expression “knowledge is power,” the
new knowledge that McEachern provides about North Korea empowers the reader, as it gives
readers insight into the North Korean political mind. At the very least, the book destroys the
stereotype of North Korea as “irrational” or “confusing.”
While McEachern certainly achieves his objectives as stated in the beginning of the book,
new questions are raised for future investigations. McEachern’s primary focus was on North
Korean-U.S. diplomatic relations, with further focus on inter-Korean relations. However, the
connections between North Korea and the former Soviet Union (now Russia) and China were
marginally examined. Without undermining the importance of the U.S. and South Korea to
North Korea, the relations with North Korea’s other two neighbors require further analysis.
Finally, the main argument of the book also raises further questions, particularly as the notion
of post-totalitarian itself may be not as original as McEachern indicates. The former Soviet
Union, a classic example of totalitarian state, at least from a theoretical standpoint, is known
for inter-party struggle even during times when the totalitarianism was at its zenith. Finally,
the reader may be likely to generally ponder the nature of types of resistance to totalitarian
authority. McEachern claims that North Korea does not have any organized opposition to the
state. However, historians have written a great deal about ‘off-kilter’ forms of resistance that
do not necessarily distract or antagonize existing domains of power but instead try to
hybridize them. Such forms of resistance are less structured but not less effective than
organized resistance. For example, North Korean defectors and North Korean businessmen
are among the agents who were involved with economic reforms under King Jong Il, to name
just a few of those who may be in disagreement with the North Korean regime. The study of
these less visible forms of resistance can bring some light to the human history of North
Korea and complement its political history, so well portrayed by McEachern.
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